Una pregunta inicial y fundamental para empezar la reflexión sería: en qué somos los seres humanos iguales y qué diferencias serían aceptables entre nosotros. Así uno de los retos de la sociedad actual sería cómo conjugar la igualdad social (y económica) y el derecho al reconocimiento cultural diferenciado. A menudo se han presentado como un binomio opuesto y difícilmente reconciliable. De manera tal que para lograr más igualdad de derechos políticos y sociales se tenía que perderla identidad más tribal.

Guizot aprendió el oficio de historiador preparando con su esposa,Pauline de Meulan, una edición crítica en francés de _Decline and Fall_ de Gibbon. Las personalidades históricas de Gibbon y Guizot fueron muy distintas. También sus respectivos “estilos de historia”. Pero en las obras de Guizot, en especial en su _Historia de la civilización en Europa_, es reconocible el legado de Gibbon. Así, en la eliminación de la barrera entre historia civil y historia religiosa, en la amplitud temática, en la ambición (...) cronológica y en una idea de Europa concebida como algo más que la suma de sus partes. Asimismo en la adopción de la misma palabra _civilización_ y en el hecho de que la interpretación guizotiana de la historia europea hunda sus raíces en tres factores presentes en Gibbon: lo que sobrevivió de las instituciones romanas, el impacto del cristianismo y el aporte germánico. (shrink)

Quins són els valors que regeixen la nostra vida? I per què vivim amb aquests valors i no amb uns altres? «Els valors van cap a on anem nosaltres perquè van amb nosaltres. ¬I mentre fem camí o mentre el busquem, els valors ens alimenten», diu el filòsof.

There is a section in Samuel Delany’s magnificent autobiographical meditation, The Motion of Light in Water, that dramatically raises the problem of writing the history of difference, the history, that is, of the designation of “other,” of the attribution of characteristics that distinguish categories of people from some presumed norm.1 Delany recounts his reaction to his first visit to the St. Marks bathhouse in 1963. He remembers standing on the threshold of a “gym-sized room” dimly lit by blue bulbs. The (...) room was full of people, some standing, the rest an undulating mass of naked, male bodies, spread wall to wall. My first response was a kind of heart-thudding astonishment very close to fear. I have written of a space at certain libidinal saturation before. That was not what frightened me. It was rather that the saturation was not only kinesthetic but visible.2Watching the scene establishes for Delany a “fact that flew in the face” of the prevailing representation of homosexuals in the 1950s as “isolated perverts,” as subjects “gone awry.” The “apprehension of massed bodies” gave him a “sense of political power”:what this experience said was that there was a population—not of individual homosexuals … not of hundreds, not of thousands, but rather of millions of gay men, and that history had, actively and already, created for us whole galleries of institutions, good and bad, to accommodate our sex. [M, p. 174] 2. Samuel R. Delany, The Motion of Light in Water: Sex and Science Fiction Writing in the East Village, 1957-1965 , p. 173; hereafter abbreviated M. Joan W. Scott is professor of social science at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey. She is the author, most recently, of Gender and the Politics of History and is currently at work on a history of feminist claims for political rights in France during the period 1789-1945 as a way of exploring arguments about equality and difference. (shrink)

The best framework for moral and political thought is the one that creates the best climate for good political judgments. I argue that universalistic theories of justice fall short in this regard because they cannot distinguish idealization from abstraction. After describing how an ethic of care guides judgments, I suggest the practical effects that make this approach preferable. The ethic of care includes more aspects of human life in making political judgments.

This collection of John Mackie's papers on personal identity and topics in moral and political philosophy, some of which have not previously been published, deal with such issues as: multiple personality; the transcendental "I"; responsibility and language; aesthetic judgements; Sidgwick's pessimism; act-utiliarianism; right-based moral theories; cooperation, competition, and moral philosophy; universalization; rights, utility, and external costs; norms and dilemmas; Parfit's population paradox; and the combination of partially-ordered preferences.

Gender, ‘race’, poverty, health and discourses of health reform in the context of globalization: a postcolonial feminist perspective in policy researchIn this paper, I draw on extant literature and my empirical work to discuss the impact of globalization and healthcare reform on the lives of women — those from countries of the South as well as of the North. First, I review briefly the economic hardships identified in different sectors of the population that have been attributed to how globalization is (...) now working. Second, I examine what these global processes mean for health, with particular focus on poverty, gender, racialization and health. Third, I reflect on how nurse scientists might develop research agendas in the 21st century that would foster social transformation and social justice for all people. The position taken here is not an indictment of globalization. Rather, I argue that globalization is a fact in all of our lives. There are positive aspects of globalization. There are also negative aspects which we must collectively address, given that the issues identified can have deleterious consequences for the world’s poor, women in particular. I suggest that, to construct knowledge for practice and praxis, research agendas of the future should be inclusive of subaltern voices. I argue that drawing on a postcolonial feminist epistemology might help us to define such agendas, and express the multilayered sociopolitical contexts of health and illness in advocacy with policy‐makers. (shrink)

Three claims about essential properties are frequently advanced in recent discussions: (1) a property belongs essentially to a thing only if that thing would cease to exist without that property, (2) an essential property is explanatory, And (3) an essential property is such that it must belong to everything to which it belongs. I argue that the "only if" in (1) cannot be changed to "if and only if" and (1) needs to be supplemented by (2), And that (2) is (...) an indispensable feature of aristotle's view of essential properties and that it casts doubt on (3), Although (2) is usually assumed to provide a reason for (3). (shrink)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank the following: Professor DW Harding for suggesting inquiry into Binet's work and for allowing use of his own ideas in ...